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Peraldus, Aquinas and the Tradition of the Seven Capital Vices

George Corbett (Cambridge University)

Of the two Dominicans William Peraldus (c. 1200-71) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), Peraldus is now barely known whereas Aquinas, canonised and a doctor of the Church, is one of the most persistent influences on Catholic philosophy and theology. During their lives, it was a different story. Dominican friars were expected to know Peraldus' Summa 'inside out' and to be able to recite, on demand, any chapter or title from the work. Given the authoritative status of Peraldus' Summa even well beyond Dominican circles, we can be confident that Aquinas knew it well. There have been, however, no detailed comparative studies of the two authors and their works. As a pilot project, this paper provides a comparative analysis of the different approaches to the seven capital vices in Peraldus's *De vitiis* and Aquinas' *De malo*.

Concerning Infnitizing Negation and Existence: A Solution to a Vague Case

Irena Cronin (University of California, Los Angeles)

Late eleventh- and through thirteenth-century logicians agreed what an infinitized negation was: it was equivalent to a noun that was negated by having 'non' placed in front of it, such as 'non-man'.¹ For many of these logicians, the term 'non-man' would stand for every existing thing that 'man' did not stand for.¹ However, in the case of categoricals with constructions with the special verbs 'begins' and 'ceases', there is a case of vagueness. For example, in 'he begins to be a non-man,' he is a non-man and he was a man earlier; and 'the donkey ceases to be a non-donkey,' the donkey is a donkey and the donkey was a non-donkey earlier. Vagueness is an issue here at those intermediate instances when the man is becoming a non-man and the donkey is ceasing to be a non-donkey. A way to solve this issue is to include the notion of '*nullus*', which is said of non-existent things, so that 'he begins to be a non-man' signifies he is a non-man, he was a '*nullus*' thing right before he became a non-man, and he was a man before that. Priscian, master W., Master Willam and Master Joscelin all commented on the notion of '*nullus*'; even though the solution to the particular vagueness I talk of here was not explicitly discussed by these thinkers, their comments taken together suggest this solution. I present this solution in more detail in my paper, and show the positives, as well as bring up some issues associated with it.

¹ Terence Parsons, *Articulating Medieval Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 73. Peter of Spain in *Synkategoreumata* 2.9-15 has a dissenting view that an infinitized term is ambiguous, that is, it could indicate non-existing "beings" as well as existing beings.

Aristotelian Plenitude: Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas on the Principle of Plenitude

Luca Gili (University of Leuven)

This paper aims to show why Aristotle seems to have endorsed opposite perspectives on the topic: it claims that Aristotle subscribed to the principle when he was providing an account of the reality of change within the epistemic constraints of understanding, but that he did not accept it when he was analysing reality from a merely logical viewpoint. This study claims that Aquinas rejected Aristotle's (and Averroes') epistemic accounts, and that he consistently subscribed to Aristotle's logical analysis of reality.

Why the Long Middle Ages are important for a Real History of Philosophy

John Marenbon (Cambridge University)

History of philosophy includes any sort of discussion or use of philosophy of the past. By 'Real History of Philosophy', I mean that part of history of philosophy which is intended to be of intrinsic value, rather than of instrumental value to the practice of contemporary philosophy (or which, whatever its author's intention, is in fact of high intrinsic value). In the first part of my talk, I shall explain this distinction in more detail, why it is worth making, and why it should be used rather than the commonly-made distinction between history of philosophy and intellectual history. In the second part, I shall explain why the philosophy of the Long Middle Ages is central to a Real History of Philosophy in the western tradition, not just because it occupies a large part of it, but because a Real History becomes impossible when it is put, as usual, on the side-lines.

Is Socrates a Universal? Audacious Views in Early Twelfth-Century Realism

Caterina Tarlazzi (Cambridge University)

The paper analyses an early 12th-century view that can be labeled "individuum-theory". This theory is mentioned (either endorsed, or criticised) in several 12th-century texts, both published and unpublished, the most famous of which are Abelard's *Logicae*. It holds that genera and species are the individuals themselves. By doing so, it is a form of realism (universals are things: the individual things), while also endorsing the nominalist claim that all that exists is individual. I will first present the theory as a reaction against an earlier form of realism, material essence realism. I will then investigate the theory's strategies, arguing it that uses Abelardian tools to defend its audacious, ultimately paradoxical, view.