The next meeting will take place on 3rd November 2015 at The Warburg Institute, Woburn Square, London, WC1H 0AB.
11:00-12:00: Marcio Augusto Damin Custodio (State University of Campinas)
Aquinas Reconstruction of Aristotle's Identity Thesis of Metaphysics VII, 6
12:00-13:00: Can Laurens Loewe (KU Leuven)
The Blessed Virgin and the Two Time-Series: The Limit Decision Problem in Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain
13:00-15:15: Lunch break
15:15-16:15: Joseph Sternberg (University of Colorado)
Aquinas on the Relationship between the Vision and Delight in Perfect Happiness
16:15-16:45: Coffee break
16:45-17:45: Luigi Campi (Università degli Studi di Torino)
‘God is the rewarder not of nouns but adverbs’: Hunting Abelardian Ghosts
Abstracts
‘God is the rewarder not of nouns but adverbs’: Hunting Abelardian Ghosts
Luigi Campi (Università degli Studi di Torino)
My paper presents the first results of an on-going research I am undertaking on the phrase “God is Rewarder not of Nouns but of Adverbs”. Although it had a widespread circulation in the late Middle Ages and Early Modern period, it has been mostly overlooked by intellectual historians. As far as I can tell, its earlier appearance is found in Bernard of Parme’s Ordinary Gloss to the Gregorian Decretals (c. 1241). Intriguingly enough, Bernard ascribed such a phrase to “Io. quidam sapiens phantasma” (“Io., a certain wise ghost”). After surveying some stages of this phrase’s diffusion, the paper faces the question of its attribution. Both the hypotheses proposed, however, have not provided any positive textual evidence so far. Eventually, the paper takes into closer consideration Bernard’s excerpt and its textual components, and raises some questions concerning their connection with Abelard’s controversial ethical teaching.
Aquinas Reconstruction of Aristotle's Identity Thesis of Metaphysics VII, 6
Márcio A. Damin Custódio (State University of Campinas)
I intend to present my reconstruction of Aquinas lesson on Aristotle's Metaphysics, VII, 6 1031a15-1032a11, on the question whether the thing is identical to its essence. I hold that Aquinas provides a consistent interpretation of the identity theses, despite been guided by his understand that sensible substances must be considered as primary entities. I will argue that Aquinas holds the priority of sensible substances, and try to make it compatible with the treatment given to essence in Metaphysics Z, 6. I will consider especially those passages where it looks like Aristotle says that the priority must be given to the essence, identified with form, one of the hylomorfic components of sensible substances. In doing so, I also intend to show how Aquinas makes Metaphysics Z, 6 compatible with compromises assumed by him in Being and Essence, with Aristotle's Categories.
The Blessed Virgin and the Two Time-Series: The Limit Decision Problem in Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain
Can Laurens Loewe (KU Leuven)
In Physics VIII, 8, Aristotle discusses a problem that arises for the temporal characterization of changes between contradictory conditions, such as the change of a body from not-white to white. The problem has come to be known as the “limit decision problem”, and can be formulated as follows: when does a body that changes from, say, not white to white cease to be not white, and begin to be white? Intuitively, it seems very easy to assign the temporal
limits: the body has a last instant of being not white, and a first instant of being white. However, Aristotle finds this solution unacceptable because, on his theory of the continuum, no two instants can be immediate successors. As an alternative, Aristotle proposes that there is, in reality, only one temporal limit, and that this limit belongs to the posterior condition. On his view, there is, in a change from not white to white, a first instant of being white, but no last instant of being not white.
Since the pioneering work of Norman Kretzmann and Simo Knuuttila in the 1970s, many aspects of the scholastic discussion of Aristotle’s limit decision problem have been studied; and it is generally known that new non-Aristotelian solutions to this problem emerged (e.g., with Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, or Landulf Caraccioli). The goal of my paper is to examine two non-Aristotelian solutions that have not received any scholarly attention so far: the solutions provided by Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain. In their respective discussions of the sanctification of the Holy Virgin in their Sentences Commentaries, they both argue that a satisfactory answer to the limit decision problem has to take into account not only Aristotelian continuous time but also (non-Aristotelian) discrete time.
I will first consider why Hervaeus and Durandus think that discrete time needs to be considered. I will argue that they think this because they take discrete time to be the proper measure of corruptible substantial forms and static accidental forms (i.e., accidents that do not have temporal parts), and these forms are precisely the ones concerned by changes between contradictory conditions. Secondly, I will show that, for Hervaeus and Durandus, discrete time has some properties that continuous time does not have, one such property being that one instant immediately succeeds another. Accordingly, for them, the possibility emerges of defending the non-Aristotelian solution that there is a last instant of the prior condition as well as a first instant of the posterior condition, and they defend precisely this solution, as I will argue. Thirdly, I will show that despite their common approach, Hervaeus and Durandus differ greatly in their assessment of Aristotle’s solution to the limit decision problem. While Hervaeus argues that the Aristotelian solution can coexist with a solution in terms of discrete time because continuous and discrete time are two non-intersecting time- series, Durandus argues that the Aristotelian solution breaks down.
Aquinas on the Relationship between the Vision and Delight in Perfect Happiness
Joseph Sternberg (University of Colorado)
One vexed philosophical question that once enjoyed great esteem is this: in the Beatific Vision that the saints enjoy in heaven, does happiness (beatitudo) consist in the vision of God, in delight in God, or in a combination of the vision and the delight? The answer that one gives to this question apparently commits one to a view about what happiness is ultimately about. It has long been thought that Aquinas holds that happiness consists in the vision of God alone. In this essay, I argue that, on this important issue, Aquinas actually holds that happiness consists both in the vision of God and delight in God, but that – unlike some of his contemporaries – Aquinas unequivocally affirms that the vision is more important in happiness than the delight. After arguing for this interpretation, I consider the quite compelling account of perfect and imperfect happiness that follows from it.
11:00-12:00: Marcio Augusto Damin Custodio (State University of Campinas)
Aquinas Reconstruction of Aristotle's Identity Thesis of Metaphysics VII, 6
12:00-13:00: Can Laurens Loewe (KU Leuven)
The Blessed Virgin and the Two Time-Series: The Limit Decision Problem in Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain
13:00-15:15: Lunch break
15:15-16:15: Joseph Sternberg (University of Colorado)
Aquinas on the Relationship between the Vision and Delight in Perfect Happiness
16:15-16:45: Coffee break
16:45-17:45: Luigi Campi (Università degli Studi di Torino)
‘God is the rewarder not of nouns but adverbs’: Hunting Abelardian Ghosts
Abstracts
‘God is the rewarder not of nouns but adverbs’: Hunting Abelardian Ghosts
Luigi Campi (Università degli Studi di Torino)
My paper presents the first results of an on-going research I am undertaking on the phrase “God is Rewarder not of Nouns but of Adverbs”. Although it had a widespread circulation in the late Middle Ages and Early Modern period, it has been mostly overlooked by intellectual historians. As far as I can tell, its earlier appearance is found in Bernard of Parme’s Ordinary Gloss to the Gregorian Decretals (c. 1241). Intriguingly enough, Bernard ascribed such a phrase to “Io. quidam sapiens phantasma” (“Io., a certain wise ghost”). After surveying some stages of this phrase’s diffusion, the paper faces the question of its attribution. Both the hypotheses proposed, however, have not provided any positive textual evidence so far. Eventually, the paper takes into closer consideration Bernard’s excerpt and its textual components, and raises some questions concerning their connection with Abelard’s controversial ethical teaching.
Aquinas Reconstruction of Aristotle's Identity Thesis of Metaphysics VII, 6
Márcio A. Damin Custódio (State University of Campinas)
I intend to present my reconstruction of Aquinas lesson on Aristotle's Metaphysics, VII, 6 1031a15-1032a11, on the question whether the thing is identical to its essence. I hold that Aquinas provides a consistent interpretation of the identity theses, despite been guided by his understand that sensible substances must be considered as primary entities. I will argue that Aquinas holds the priority of sensible substances, and try to make it compatible with the treatment given to essence in Metaphysics Z, 6. I will consider especially those passages where it looks like Aristotle says that the priority must be given to the essence, identified with form, one of the hylomorfic components of sensible substances. In doing so, I also intend to show how Aquinas makes Metaphysics Z, 6 compatible with compromises assumed by him in Being and Essence, with Aristotle's Categories.
The Blessed Virgin and the Two Time-Series: The Limit Decision Problem in Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain
Can Laurens Loewe (KU Leuven)
In Physics VIII, 8, Aristotle discusses a problem that arises for the temporal characterization of changes between contradictory conditions, such as the change of a body from not-white to white. The problem has come to be known as the “limit decision problem”, and can be formulated as follows: when does a body that changes from, say, not white to white cease to be not white, and begin to be white? Intuitively, it seems very easy to assign the temporal
limits: the body has a last instant of being not white, and a first instant of being white. However, Aristotle finds this solution unacceptable because, on his theory of the continuum, no two instants can be immediate successors. As an alternative, Aristotle proposes that there is, in reality, only one temporal limit, and that this limit belongs to the posterior condition. On his view, there is, in a change from not white to white, a first instant of being white, but no last instant of being not white.
Since the pioneering work of Norman Kretzmann and Simo Knuuttila in the 1970s, many aspects of the scholastic discussion of Aristotle’s limit decision problem have been studied; and it is generally known that new non-Aristotelian solutions to this problem emerged (e.g., with Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, or Landulf Caraccioli). The goal of my paper is to examine two non-Aristotelian solutions that have not received any scholarly attention so far: the solutions provided by Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain. In their respective discussions of the sanctification of the Holy Virgin in their Sentences Commentaries, they both argue that a satisfactory answer to the limit decision problem has to take into account not only Aristotelian continuous time but also (non-Aristotelian) discrete time.
I will first consider why Hervaeus and Durandus think that discrete time needs to be considered. I will argue that they think this because they take discrete time to be the proper measure of corruptible substantial forms and static accidental forms (i.e., accidents that do not have temporal parts), and these forms are precisely the ones concerned by changes between contradictory conditions. Secondly, I will show that, for Hervaeus and Durandus, discrete time has some properties that continuous time does not have, one such property being that one instant immediately succeeds another. Accordingly, for them, the possibility emerges of defending the non-Aristotelian solution that there is a last instant of the prior condition as well as a first instant of the posterior condition, and they defend precisely this solution, as I will argue. Thirdly, I will show that despite their common approach, Hervaeus and Durandus differ greatly in their assessment of Aristotle’s solution to the limit decision problem. While Hervaeus argues that the Aristotelian solution can coexist with a solution in terms of discrete time because continuous and discrete time are two non-intersecting time- series, Durandus argues that the Aristotelian solution breaks down.
Aquinas on the Relationship between the Vision and Delight in Perfect Happiness
Joseph Sternberg (University of Colorado)
One vexed philosophical question that once enjoyed great esteem is this: in the Beatific Vision that the saints enjoy in heaven, does happiness (beatitudo) consist in the vision of God, in delight in God, or in a combination of the vision and the delight? The answer that one gives to this question apparently commits one to a view about what happiness is ultimately about. It has long been thought that Aquinas holds that happiness consists in the vision of God alone. In this essay, I argue that, on this important issue, Aquinas actually holds that happiness consists both in the vision of God and delight in God, but that – unlike some of his contemporaries – Aquinas unequivocally affirms that the vision is more important in happiness than the delight. After arguing for this interpretation, I consider the quite compelling account of perfect and imperfect happiness that follows from it.