Medieval Philosophy Network, 21st Meeting
30 April 2019
The Warburg Institute | University of London | School of Advanced Study | Woburn Square | London WC1H 0AB
PROGRAM:
11:30 - 12:30 Tom Pink (King’s College London)
“Final causation in early modern Jesuit thought: finality in nature and normative power”
12:30 - 14:00 Lunch break
14:00 - 15:00 Stephen Read (University of St Andrews)
“The Rule of Contradictory Pairs, Insolubles and Validity”
15:00 - 16:00 Lily King (University of South Florida)
“Reevaluating the Kantian Appraisal of Abelard’s Ethics”
16:00 – 16:30 Coffee/Tea break
16:30 – 17:30 Simon Hewitt (University of Leeds)
“Unravelling Stump's Non-Apophatic Aquinas”
17:30 Conference ends
* * *
ABSTRACTS:
“Final causation in early modern Jesuit thought: finality in nature and normative power”
By Thomas Pink (King’s College London)
In early modern Jesuit thought we find a restriction of final causation to the goal-directed agency of minds, and a denial that it is to be found in end-directed processes in wider nature. There is indeed some denial that ends operate as causes at all, even within the mind. The paper examines this development and distinguishes it from scepticism about final causation in early modern writers hostile to scholasticism. This Jesuit tradition is not sceptical of power exercised by ends, and the paper examines the continuing importance of this conception of power to their ethical and political theory, and especially to their theory of rationality and reason.
“The Rule of Contradictory Pairs, Insolubles and Validity”
Stephen Read (University of St Andrews)
The Oxford Calculator Roger Swyneshed put forward three provocative theses in his treatise on insolubles, written in the early 1330s, of which the second claims that there is a formally valid inference with true premise and false conclusion. His example deployed the Liar paradox as the conclusion of the inference: 'This is false, so this is false'. His account of insolubles supported his claim that the conclusion is false, and so the premise, referring to the conclusion, would seem to be true. But what is his account of validity, that can allow true premises to lead to a false conclusion? We consider Roger's own account, as well as that of Paul of Venice, writing some sixty years later, whose account of the truth and falsehood of insolubles followed Roger's closely. Paul endorsed Roger's three theses. But their accounts of validity were different. The question is whether these accounts are coherent and support Paul's claim in his Logica Magna that he endorsed all the normal rules of formal validity.
“Reevaluating the Kantian Appraisal of Abelard’s Ethics”
By Lyly King (University of Florida)
Though there has been much debate about whether Abelard’s ethics are dangerously subjective or surprisingly absolutist, one thing is unanimous: they are intentionalist. The goal of this article is to parse out what, exactly, should be meant by this claim. Though much of the secondary literature on Abelard suggests that he has a “proto-Kantian” account of moral praiseworthiness, I argue that this is mistaken. As far as Abelard is concerned, one’s intention in acting is not the reason they supply for acting. Instead, intention is the desire motivating the action. This becomes clear when seeking to understand Abelard’s use of intentio with a view to his Commentary on Romans. Using the account of intentio I argue for—one nuanced by Abelard’s own theological commitments and biblical exegesis—Abelard’s ethics is not a case for the “moral neutrality of the passions.” Nor is it an ethic of “pure reason.” Instead, Abelard’s ethics is an affective intentionalism.
“Unravelling Stump's Non-Apophatic Aquinas”
By Simon Hewitt (University of Leeds)
Prefacing q3 of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas - who takes himself to have established by this point that God exists - tells his reader that 'we cannot know what God is, but only what he is not. So to study him, we study what he has not'. The doctrine of divine simplicity which he then goes on to develop fits naturally with a reading of Aquinas as a mystical theologian, who thinks that God's nature is hidden from us, and that we are united with God 'as to one unknown' . This reading is commonplace amongst theologians and has found recent advocates in Davies, Turner and McCabe. Within analytic philosophy of religion, however, there has been a tendency to play down Aquinas' apophaticism. In this talk I take Elenore Stump's treatment of divine simplicity in her Aquinas as a case study, and argue against her reasons for thinking that Aquinas is not the apophaticist others have taken him to be.
11:30 - 12:30 Tom Pink (King’s College London)
“Final causation in early modern Jesuit thought: finality in nature and normative power”
12:30 - 14:00 Lunch break
14:00 - 15:00 Stephen Read (University of St Andrews)
“The Rule of Contradictory Pairs, Insolubles and Validity”
15:00 - 16:00 Lily King (University of South Florida)
“Reevaluating the Kantian Appraisal of Abelard’s Ethics”
16:00 – 16:30 Coffee/Tea break
16:30 – 17:30 Simon Hewitt (University of Leeds)
“Unravelling Stump's Non-Apophatic Aquinas”
17:30 Conference ends
* * *
ABSTRACTS:
“Final causation in early modern Jesuit thought: finality in nature and normative power”
By Thomas Pink (King’s College London)
In early modern Jesuit thought we find a restriction of final causation to the goal-directed agency of minds, and a denial that it is to be found in end-directed processes in wider nature. There is indeed some denial that ends operate as causes at all, even within the mind. The paper examines this development and distinguishes it from scepticism about final causation in early modern writers hostile to scholasticism. This Jesuit tradition is not sceptical of power exercised by ends, and the paper examines the continuing importance of this conception of power to their ethical and political theory, and especially to their theory of rationality and reason.
“The Rule of Contradictory Pairs, Insolubles and Validity”
Stephen Read (University of St Andrews)
The Oxford Calculator Roger Swyneshed put forward three provocative theses in his treatise on insolubles, written in the early 1330s, of which the second claims that there is a formally valid inference with true premise and false conclusion. His example deployed the Liar paradox as the conclusion of the inference: 'This is false, so this is false'. His account of insolubles supported his claim that the conclusion is false, and so the premise, referring to the conclusion, would seem to be true. But what is his account of validity, that can allow true premises to lead to a false conclusion? We consider Roger's own account, as well as that of Paul of Venice, writing some sixty years later, whose account of the truth and falsehood of insolubles followed Roger's closely. Paul endorsed Roger's three theses. But their accounts of validity were different. The question is whether these accounts are coherent and support Paul's claim in his Logica Magna that he endorsed all the normal rules of formal validity.
“Reevaluating the Kantian Appraisal of Abelard’s Ethics”
By Lyly King (University of Florida)
Though there has been much debate about whether Abelard’s ethics are dangerously subjective or surprisingly absolutist, one thing is unanimous: they are intentionalist. The goal of this article is to parse out what, exactly, should be meant by this claim. Though much of the secondary literature on Abelard suggests that he has a “proto-Kantian” account of moral praiseworthiness, I argue that this is mistaken. As far as Abelard is concerned, one’s intention in acting is not the reason they supply for acting. Instead, intention is the desire motivating the action. This becomes clear when seeking to understand Abelard’s use of intentio with a view to his Commentary on Romans. Using the account of intentio I argue for—one nuanced by Abelard’s own theological commitments and biblical exegesis—Abelard’s ethics is not a case for the “moral neutrality of the passions.” Nor is it an ethic of “pure reason.” Instead, Abelard’s ethics is an affective intentionalism.
“Unravelling Stump's Non-Apophatic Aquinas”
By Simon Hewitt (University of Leeds)
Prefacing q3 of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas - who takes himself to have established by this point that God exists - tells his reader that 'we cannot know what God is, but only what he is not. So to study him, we study what he has not'. The doctrine of divine simplicity which he then goes on to develop fits naturally with a reading of Aquinas as a mystical theologian, who thinks that God's nature is hidden from us, and that we are united with God 'as to one unknown' . This reading is commonplace amongst theologians and has found recent advocates in Davies, Turner and McCabe. Within analytic philosophy of religion, however, there has been a tendency to play down Aquinas' apophaticism. In this talk I take Elenore Stump's treatment of divine simplicity in her Aquinas as a case study, and argue against her reasons for thinking that Aquinas is not the apophaticist others have taken him to be.
