Medieval Philosophy Network,
12th Meeting
1 April 2016
The Warburg Institute | University of London | School of Advanced Study | Woburn Square | London WC1H 0AB
Schedule
[12.30 Meet outside the Warburg for those who would like to attend lunch.]
13.45-14.05
Dragos Calma (University of Cambridge)
An anniversary today: the object of philosophy
14.05-15.05
Ian Logan (Blackfriars, Oxford)
Per rationalem mentem: Anselm’s ‘turn to the subject’
15.05-16.05
Anna-Katharina Strohschneider
(Würzburg University/Warburg Institute)
Agostino Nifo on Averroes and the Relationship between Physics and Metaphysics
16.05-16.35
Coffee Break
16.35-17.45
Wilfrid Hodges (Queen Mary College, London)
Buridan and the Avicenna-Johnston semantics (with response by Spencer Johnston (University of York)
17.45
End of Meeting
Abstracts
'Per rationalem mentem: Anselm’s ‘turn to the subject'
Ian Logan - Blackfriars Hall, Oxford
In the Monologion and Proslogion, Anselm addresses the existence and nature of God and how it is that rational investigation of the ineffable is possible. Prima facie the treatment of these questions appears very different in the two works. However, there is commonality in their use of the imagery of sight and light. By investigating this common imagery and the epistemological function of the imago dei in Anselm’s anthropology, I uncover an important aspect of the methodological relationship between the Monologion and Proslogion: the logical dependence of the argument of the earlier work (Monologion) on the later (Proslogion). I contend that the argument of the Proslogion represents the application of, and provides or is intended to provide the justification for, the philosophical ‘turn to the subject’, which Anselm articulates in Monologion 66 - that it is through reflecting on itself that the rational mind comes to knowledge of the supreme being. Though articulated there this approach is not systematically employed nor grounded in the Monologion. I suggest that it is the argument of the Proslogion that grounds the epistemological role that Anselm gives to the imago dei in the Monologion. Anselm does not need to rehearse the trinitarian argument of the Monologion in the Proslogion, precisely because, having established God’s existence and attributes by his unum argumentum, which constitutes the reflection on the thinking self that he had proposed in the Monologion, he has provided the foundation for the trinitarian argument based on the notion of the imago dei that is articulated in the Monologion.
'Agostino Nifo on Averroes and the Relationship between Physics and Metaphysics'
Anna-Katharina Strohschneider, Universität Würzburg
The Renaissance Averroist Agostino Nifo was not only interested in Averroes' theory of the intellect, but also in his metaphysics – so much, in fact, that he wrote a super commentary on the twelfth book of Averroes' Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. In his work Averroes writes at length about the relationship between physics and metaphysics, defending his own theory against both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Avicenna. That means that Nifo, too, must take a stand on the division of labour between the two sciences. I argue that Nifo actually introduces a slightly different take on the respective responsibilities of physics and metaphysics by paraphrasing and explaining Averroes' theory. Nifo puts more emphasis than Averroes himself on the type of demonstration the two sciences employ, while the latter is more concerned with the things that each science studies.
'Buridan and the Avicenna-Johnston Semantics'
Wilfrid Hodges (Queen Mary College, London)
In his recent PhD thesis (St Andrews 2015) Spencer Johnston gave a Kripke semantics for Buridan's divided modal logic and showed that it upholds all Buridan's claims of validity and invalidity in this logic. It turns out that Johnston's semantics is formally equivalent to (i.e. a notational variant of) a translation of Buridan's modal logic into the dtz fragment of Avicenna's two-dimensional logic. Since the relationship between Avicenna's alethic modal logic and his 2D logic is one of the major questions about his logic, one naturally asks whether his 2D logic does the same for his modal logic as Johnston's semantics does for Buridan's logic. I think this is dead right. It explains many things, for example why Avicenna keeps emphasising that his 2D logic doesn't involve possible entities. But some puzzles remain.
12th Meeting
1 April 2016
The Warburg Institute | University of London | School of Advanced Study | Woburn Square | London WC1H 0AB
Schedule
[12.30 Meet outside the Warburg for those who would like to attend lunch.]
13.45-14.05
Dragos Calma (University of Cambridge)
An anniversary today: the object of philosophy
14.05-15.05
Ian Logan (Blackfriars, Oxford)
Per rationalem mentem: Anselm’s ‘turn to the subject’
15.05-16.05
Anna-Katharina Strohschneider
(Würzburg University/Warburg Institute)
Agostino Nifo on Averroes and the Relationship between Physics and Metaphysics
16.05-16.35
Coffee Break
16.35-17.45
Wilfrid Hodges (Queen Mary College, London)
Buridan and the Avicenna-Johnston semantics (with response by Spencer Johnston (University of York)
17.45
End of Meeting
Abstracts
'Per rationalem mentem: Anselm’s ‘turn to the subject'
Ian Logan - Blackfriars Hall, Oxford
In the Monologion and Proslogion, Anselm addresses the existence and nature of God and how it is that rational investigation of the ineffable is possible. Prima facie the treatment of these questions appears very different in the two works. However, there is commonality in their use of the imagery of sight and light. By investigating this common imagery and the epistemological function of the imago dei in Anselm’s anthropology, I uncover an important aspect of the methodological relationship between the Monologion and Proslogion: the logical dependence of the argument of the earlier work (Monologion) on the later (Proslogion). I contend that the argument of the Proslogion represents the application of, and provides or is intended to provide the justification for, the philosophical ‘turn to the subject’, which Anselm articulates in Monologion 66 - that it is through reflecting on itself that the rational mind comes to knowledge of the supreme being. Though articulated there this approach is not systematically employed nor grounded in the Monologion. I suggest that it is the argument of the Proslogion that grounds the epistemological role that Anselm gives to the imago dei in the Monologion. Anselm does not need to rehearse the trinitarian argument of the Monologion in the Proslogion, precisely because, having established God’s existence and attributes by his unum argumentum, which constitutes the reflection on the thinking self that he had proposed in the Monologion, he has provided the foundation for the trinitarian argument based on the notion of the imago dei that is articulated in the Monologion.
'Agostino Nifo on Averroes and the Relationship between Physics and Metaphysics'
Anna-Katharina Strohschneider, Universität Würzburg
The Renaissance Averroist Agostino Nifo was not only interested in Averroes' theory of the intellect, but also in his metaphysics – so much, in fact, that he wrote a super commentary on the twelfth book of Averroes' Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. In his work Averroes writes at length about the relationship between physics and metaphysics, defending his own theory against both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Avicenna. That means that Nifo, too, must take a stand on the division of labour between the two sciences. I argue that Nifo actually introduces a slightly different take on the respective responsibilities of physics and metaphysics by paraphrasing and explaining Averroes' theory. Nifo puts more emphasis than Averroes himself on the type of demonstration the two sciences employ, while the latter is more concerned with the things that each science studies.
'Buridan and the Avicenna-Johnston Semantics'
Wilfrid Hodges (Queen Mary College, London)
In his recent PhD thesis (St Andrews 2015) Spencer Johnston gave a Kripke semantics for Buridan's divided modal logic and showed that it upholds all Buridan's claims of validity and invalidity in this logic. It turns out that Johnston's semantics is formally equivalent to (i.e. a notational variant of) a translation of Buridan's modal logic into the dtz fragment of Avicenna's two-dimensional logic. Since the relationship between Avicenna's alethic modal logic and his 2D logic is one of the major questions about his logic, one naturally asks whether his 2D logic does the same for his modal logic as Johnston's semantics does for Buridan's logic. I think this is dead right. It explains many things, for example why Avicenna keeps emphasising that his 2D logic doesn't involve possible entities. But some puzzles remain.
